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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________  
 
No. 14-1712 
___________ 
 
RONALD G. DANDAR, 
                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-00330) 
 District Judge:  Honorable J. Frederick Motz 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and Consideration  
of Whether a Certificate of Appealability is Required 
October 30, 2014 
 
 Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges  
 
 (Filed: November 13, 2014) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION* 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Ronald Dandar appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his motion 
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  We will affirm.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 
(2008); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Dandar instituted this action by submitting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to 
the District Court along with a motion for leave to proceed IFP.  The filing fee for the 
habeas petition is $5.00.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).  A Magistrate Judge denied the IFP 
motion because Dandar’s prison account statement showed that he had sufficient funds to 
pay the fee.  Dandar filed a motion for reconsideration, captioned, “Motion as to Whether 
Denial of In Forma Pauperis was Constitutional.”  The District Court, apparently 
construing the motion as an appeal from the Magistrate Judge’s order, denied Dandar’s 
motion.  Dandar timely appealed. 
 The denial of a motion for leave to proceed IFP is final and appealable, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801, 803 (3d 
Cir. 2003).1  We review the denial of leave to proceed IFP for abuse of discretion.  See 
Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985).  “In this circuit, leave to proceed 
[IFP] is based on a showing of indigence.”  Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Dandar to pay the $5.00 
filing fee.  Dandar had a balance of over $1000 at the time he submitted his IFP 
                                              
1 We have not decided whether a certificate of appealability is necessary to appeal the District Court’s denial of 
leave to proceed IFP in a habeas proceeding.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).  To the extent that a certificate of 
appealability might be required, we deny it for the reasons discussed herein. 
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application to the District Court.  His account balance never fell below $100 in the six 
months prior to the filing.  Thus, requiring Dandar to pay the $5.00 filing fee did not 
impermissibly “‘force [him] to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in order to 
spare himself complete destitution.’”  Jones, 752 F.2d at 79 (quoting Adkins v. Dupont 
Co., 335 U.S. 331, 340 (1948), and holding that District Court abused its discretion in 
requiring prisoner to pay $5.00 fee from an account balance of only $17.39).  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Our ruling is without 
prejudice to Dandar’s right to refile his habeas petition with the $5.00 filing fee or 
resubmit it with another motion for leave to proceed IFP, as his circumstances may 
warrant.2 
                                              
2 We granted Dandar leave to proceed IFP on appeal, but our action is not inconsistent with the denial of his IFP 
motion at the District Court level because the $505.00 fee for filing a notice of appeal is far higher than the $5.00 fee 
for filing a habeas petition. 
